LA BATALLA DE INGLATERRA STEPHEN BUNGAY PDF

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In particular I enjoyed the chapter dedicated to the development of the Spitfire and Hurricane. Unfortunately that is where the positives end, there is nothing new in this book. After 20 pages I was almost ready to give up on this book, however I persevered only to find my disappointment grew and grew. I bought the book based on reviews and recommendations from The Most Dangerous Book: A Distortion of the Battle of Britain To begin with the positives, this book is well researched and well written.

I bought the book based on reviews and recommendations from people constantly saying that this is the one true book on the Battle of Britain It became more and more obvious that the author had a pre-determined agenda to prove how bad the Luftwaffe was.

This is where the extensive research comes into its own, in finding the most appropriate evidence to support the authors theory, discounting evidence that contradicts it and misrepresenting information and facts to suit. For example the topic of combat claims is raised, on the one hand the author states that this is understandable on the part of the RAF due to the "fog of war" then suggests that Luftwaffe over claims were in part due to fraudulent reporting.

There is no evidence provided to back up either claim whether it is correct or not. The author also states that over-claims are regularly but with clever manipulation something the author is good at it can be proved that the RAF over claims were almost from 10th July to 11th August the author says that there were German aircraft destroyed in combat; actual RAF claims for the same period including confirmed, unconfirmed and duplicate claims is somewhere in the region of Another example relates to German intelligence reports at the beginning of the battle and how this proves the Germans were incompetent.

The author takes four points raised in a report produced on 16th July whereas the report actually includes more than twenty separate statements. Having read a translation of the report it is clear that the author has chosen carefully which parts to summarise and in the process twisting the facts to suit his theory: From the book - "Both the Hurricane and Spitfire were inferior to the BfF which was not yet in production and only a skilfully handled Spitfire was better than the Bf From the book - "The number of operational airfields in Southern England was severely limited.

However, only a limited number can be considered as operational airfields with modern maintenance and supply installations. In general, the well-equipped airfields are used as take-off and landing bases, while the numerous smaller airfields located in the vicinity serve as alternate landing grounds and rest bases.

The report says there were a considerable number of airstrips with only a limited number being operational From the book - "The British aircraft industry was producing frontline fighters a month the true figure for July was and would decrease.

In view of the present conditions relating to production the appearance of raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production and factories owing to air attacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganisation of the aircraft industry now in progress , it is believed that for the time being output will decrease rather than increase.

If the June figures for production are available the latest at the time of the report the average production rate over the previous six months would have been fighters per month, if production figures were only available from May the first month the British broke through the per month mark then the average over the previous six months would have been fighters per month. By throwing in the production figure for July, a figure that no one could have known at the time of the report, the author of the book is manipulating the evidence, yet again, to prove his theory.

As for the decrease in production predicted by the Germans this did actually happen and it would not be until Feb that the production rates would be back up to the figure achieved in July The average production rate of fighters for the six months following July were in the region of per month. In document WP 40 Second Report on the Ministry of Aircraft production it states for September "We lost machines as compared with August output" in relation to production of all aircraft types.

From the book - "Command at all levels was inflexible, with fighters being rigidly tied to their home bases, and station commanders were non-flyers most flew regularly. As formations are rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium level suffers mainly from operations being controlled in most cases by officers no longer accustomed to flying station commanders.

Command at low level is generally energetic but lacks tactical skill. It was also contrary to the way the Germans did things. To the Luftwaffe this concept was alien and therefore, in their eyes at least, flawed. Why the author of the book had to emphasise the incorrect statement that station commanders were non-flyers is just another example of his need to bend the truth to suit his theory.

The German report says that station commanders are no longer accustomed to flying NOT that they were non-flyers. In fact this is true, station commanders rarely took part in operational flying except as observers.

The Germans felt this was a weakness because it meant that those devising the everyday tactics were out of touch. They were the ones adapting and modifying the tactics as their experience grew. The above examples are mainly taken from just one page of the book but are representative of the many, many areas of the text that show the authors true intentions. I have called this book "The Most Dangerous Book" because I believe it purposely misleads the reader.

Buy this book by all means, it is a reasonable read and well written but please, please, please I urge all who buy it, DO NOT make this the one book on the Battle of Britain that you own and take the analysis offered with a pinch of salt.

There are far better sources of information out there and relying on this book will give you a false perspective on the events of the Summer and Autumn of Try the Battle of Britain Historical Society website for example, a much more rounded, unbiased account of events or the book "Battle of Britain: A day-to-day chronicle, 10 July October " by Patrick Bishop.

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